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Following the 9/11 terrorist events in the United States, the Mexican Navy 
developed strategies designed to prevent similar attacks on the strategic facilities 
located in the Campeche Sound in the Gulf of Mexico. The Sound is of great 
economic importance because more than 83 percent of the petroleum produced 
in Mexico is extracted from that area. This also makes it a key potential target for 
international terrorists. 
This research analyzed and evaluated the Mexican Navy’s allocation of 
surveillance and interdiction resources assigned to the Campeche Sound. The 
data was obtained via an agent-based simulation, implemented through the use 
of the software program Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA). The 
simulation model includes the presence of terrorist boats attacking oil platforms, 
the Navy resources in the area, service-provider ships in the Sound, and fishing 
boats that often penetrate into the Sound’s exclusion and prevention zones. 
From the study is concluded that: the most important threat factor in the 
scenarios is the speed of the enemy boats; and, with its broad surveillance and 
communication capabilities, the HAWKEYE is the most important navy resource 
in the area.  The results also provide an operational guide to allocate the Navy 





































The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this 
research may not have been exercised for all cases of interest. Every effort 
has been made within the time available to ensure that the programs are free 
of computational and logical errors. Still, they cannot be considered validated. 
Thus any application of these programs without additional verification is at the 
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The Campeche Sound is an area of great economic importance to Mexico: 
more than 83 percent of the petroleum produced in Mexico comes from there. Its 
strategic value and economic potential make it imperative that Mexico maintain 
petroleum production in the Campeche Sound. In light of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the United States, Mexico cannot discount the possibility of an attack 
on its strategic facilities, especially those located in the Campeche Sound. 
Today, PEMEX and the Mexican Navy maintain mutually supportive 
security strategies in the Campeche Sound. Prevention and exclusion areas 
have been established. In the prevention area, there is a system of access 
control for all boats. In the exclusion area, the authorized navigation of boats to 
the facilities is allowed only after being verified by units of the navy. 
As a solution, the Mexican Navy has created the Sound Task Force III, 
whose mission, in conditions of green alert (low risk of a terrorist attack), is to 
carry out naval operations in the marine and coastal zones of the Sound. The 
Task Force’s purpose is to prevent groups from carrying out acts of sabotage 
and terrorism against the strategic marine and terrestrial facilities involved in the 
extraction and refinement of hydrocarbons. 
During a state of green alert, the force deployment in the operational area 
consists of the following: 
 One HURACAN-class missile ship, SAAR 4.5, with a shipborne 
helicopter. 
 
 Four POLARIS-class interceptor patrols. 
 
 An E-2C HAWKEYE Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. 
 
 A C-212 AVIOCAR Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). 
 
 An intercepting aircraft, type REDIGO. 
 
 One helicopter, type MI-17, allocated on one of the platforms. 
In our research we developed a simulation using an agent-based model 
(ABM) that represents sixty possible scenarios depicting the Navy resources in 
the area and seventeen possible scenarios depicting potential enemies. The 
scenarios consist of one, two, or three terrorist fast-boats, or red-force boats, 
each of which is attempting to destroy an oil platform with explosives 
(kamikazes). Figure 1 shows the terrorist boats, all the resources of the Mexican 
Navy, and all the service providers’ ships that work in the area. In addition, the 
fishing boats that constantly try to penetrate the preventive zone to fish can be 
seen. A success in stopping the boats’ attack occurs when at least one Navy 
resource intercepts and kills the small boats within its weapons’ range with no 
damage to the hydrocarbon facilities. 
From one to three platforms can be destroyed, depending on the number 
of enemy boats (up to three). The Measure of Effectiveness is the probability that 
at least one platform is destroyed.  
 




The purpose of this research is to explore various scenarios the Mexican 
Navy could face in protecting critical assets in the Campeche Sound. Each 
scenario differs from the others in both the naval resources present in the area 
and the uncontrollable factors that could be present during a terrorist attack. 
This study analyzes the data obtained by the simulation of multiple runs of 
each possible scenario of the Mexican Navy and the seventeen possible 
scenarios of the terrorist boats and fishing ships in the forbidden area during a 
terrorist attack. The data is analyzed in two parts: the full model that analyzes all 
the controllable and uncontrollable factors in the model and a subgroup of the 
data that only has the controllable factors in the model.  
This study uses three analysis techniques to look at the probability of the 
enemy destroying at least one platform: Classification trees, Regression analysis, 
and the one-way analysis of means of each of the critical factors in the model. 
The critical insights are summarized in two sections: With all the critical factors 
and only with the controllable factors. 
 
Critical Factors in the full model 
The important insights found analyzing the full model are summarized in 
the following list: 
 The most important factor in the probability of destroying at least one 
platform is the speed of the terrorist boats. The speed limits the time of 
the Mexican Navy to react. 
 
 When the HAWKEYE AEW aircraft is present in the area, there is a 
significant increase in the probability of destroying the terrorist boats, 
no matter the number and speed of the terrorist boats. 
 
 The probability of killing enemy terrorist boats before they reach an oil 
platform decreases when more than two fishing boats are in the 





Critical Controllable Factors 
During the analysis of the data subgroup, which only includes the 
controllable factors (Navy resources), we gleaned several important aspects of 
the model: 
 Because of its long range surveillance radar for detection and 
classification, and significant communication capability, the HAWKEYE 
AEW aircraft is the most important of the controllable factors. 
 
 When the HAWKEYE AEW aircraft is absent in the scenario, it is 
important that the AVIOCAR MPA (which serves in a very similar role 
as the HAWKEYE AEW aircraft, but with less range in its surveillance 
radar) be present in the area.  
 
 The patrol area patrolling of the HURACAN ship is not important in the 
model. Both main patrol areas, the exclusion area and the maritime 
prevention area, have the same effect within the model. 
 
 The HURACAN ship is significant in the scenarios only when it carries 
a shipborne helicopter. 
 
 The additional POLARIS interceptor boats in the area are significant in 
the probability of destroying the terrorist boats only if the route of the 
terrorist boats lies within their patrol area. 
 
 The patrol areas of the REDIGO aircraft and the MI-17 helicopter 
patrolling are not significant in the model. This does not mean that they 
are not necessary in the scenarios; it means that any of these units’ 







I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Energy sources are strategic economic and political assets for both 
producer countries and their clients. Any interruption in the global production and 
transport of natural resources has severe economic consequences; energy being 
the most critical commodity. Major importing countries consider protection of that 
flow a significant national concern. As a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the 
United States, Mexico, one of the United States’ most important suppliers of oil, 
cannot discount the possibility of an attack on its strategic facilities, especially 
those located in the Campeche Sound. 
The Campeche Sound is of great economic importance to Mexico. More 
than 83 percent of the petroleum operated and produced in Mexico is extracted 
from that area. Its strategic importance and economic potential make it 
imperative that Mexico maintain petroleum production capacity in the Campeche 
Sound.  
The portion of the Gulf of Mexico where PEMEX (Petroleos Mexicanos) is 
active in prospecting, exploration, hydrocarbon production and exportation 
includes a total surface of 150,000 square nautical miles. PEMEX divided this 
area in two regions: a northeast region of 50,000 square nautical miles and a 
southwestern region of 100,000 square nautical miles. There are 243 marine 
platforms, 1,400 miles of submarine pipelines to transport crude petroleum, 
natural gas, and nitrogen, a maritime terminal in Dos Bocas and in Cayo Arcas, a 
ship moored for the storage of crude for exportation, and five monobuoys for the 
loading of crude oil tankers. 
During 2004 PEMEX exported a daily average of 1,844,000 barrels of 
petroleum, of which 78 percent was sent to the United States. The remaining 22 
percent was distributed to Europe, the Far East, and the rest of the Americas. 
The Mexican Navy is a national military institution, whose mission is to use 
the naval supremacy of the Federation for exterior defense and homeland 
security. Among its multiple responsibilities are: 
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 Take actions to safeguard Mexico’s national sovereignty and to defend 
the integrity of its national territory in the territorial sea, marine-
terrestrial zone, islands, keys, reefs, and continental shelf; as well as in 
its inner waters, lakes, and rivers in their navigable parts and 
corresponding airspace; 
 
 To guard Mexico’s sovereign rights in the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ); and 
 
 To protect Mexico’s strategic facilities in areas under Navy jurisdiction. 
 
B. ACTUAL SCENARIO IN THE CAMPECHE SOUND 
Today PEMEX and the Mexican Navy employ a strategy of mutual support 
in maintaining the security of petroleum production in the Campeche Sound. An 
Aerial Prevention Zone, two Maritime Prevention Zones, and three Exclusion 
Zones are established (Figure 2).  PEMEX and the Mexican Navy use these 
geographically defined zones to control activity near petroleum production 
facilities. The Aerial Prevention Zone is mentioned here to fully describe the 
control regime, though it is not used in modeling later in this thesis. 
 
Figure 2.   Areas of Prevention and Exclusion in the Campeche Sound.                 
(best viewed in color). 
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The Aerial Prevention Zone covers a polygon with an area of 14,600 
square nautical miles, formed by the lines between the vertices listed in Table 1. 
 
Vertex Lat. North Long. West 
A 20° 25’ 00” 093° 19’ 00” 
B 20° 25’ 00” 091° 30’ 00” 
C 19° 04’ 20” 091° 30’ 00” 
D 18° 50’ 00” 091° 45’ 42” 
E 18° 50’ 00” 091° 57’ 40” 
F 18° 38’ 00” 092° 00’ 00” 
G 18° 24’ 00” 093° 13’ 00” 
H 18° 50’ 00” 093° 19’ 00” 
Table 1.   Geographic Positions of the vertices of the Aerial Prevention Zone. 
 
The vertical limits of the polygon are established from the mean sea level 
to 15,000 feet. 
The Maritime Prevention areas constitute the areas M and R. Area M 
includes a rectangle with an area of 6,100 square nautical miles, formed by the 
parallels 18° 50’ 00” N and 20° 00’ 00” N and meridians 092° 50’ 00” W and 091° 
40’ 00” W. Area “R” includes a circular surface of 450 square nautical miles with 
a radius of 12 nautical miles, whose center lies in the position Lat. 20° 12’ 00” N 
and Long. 091° 57’ 30” W. 
PEMEX and the Navy of Mexico continually monitor all activity in the 
Maritime Prevention Zones. The Navy identifies and controls all maritime and 
aerial traffic that enters these zones. Fishing vessels are permitted rapid, 
uninterrupted transit through the Maritime Prevention Zones to fishing areas 
outside controlled areas after receiving authorization. No other activity is 
permitted except that required for oil exploration and production.  
The Area of Exclusion is an area in which no traffic of boats or airships is 
allowed, except that required for the operation of the oil platforms. It is 
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constituted by areas E-1, E-2, and E-3. Area E-1 includes a polygon with an area 
of 2,200 square nautical miles, formed by the union of the vertices listed in Table 
2. 
Vertex Lat. North Long. West 
A 19° 45’ 00” 092° 26’ 00” 
B 19° 45’ 00” 091° 53’ 00” 
C 19° 00’ 00” 091° 53’ 00” 
D 19° 00’ 00” 092° 26’ 00” 
E 18° 53’ 00” 092° 35’ 00” 
F 18° 53’ 00” 092° 44’ 00” 
G 19° 05’ 00” 092° 44’ 00” 
H 19° 05’ 00” 092° 40’ 00” 
I 19° 13’ 00” 092° 40’ 00” 
J 19° 13’ 00” 092° 26’ 00” 
Table 2.   Geographic Positions of the Vertices of Exclusion Zone E-1. 
 
Area E-2 includes a polygon with an area of 110 square nautical miles, 
conformed by the vertices listed in Table 3. 
 
Vertex Lat. North Long. West 
A 20° 15’ 00” 092° 03’ 00” 
B 20° 15’ 00” 091° 52’ 00” 
C 20° 07’ 00” 092° 03’ 00” 
D 20° 07’ 00” 091° 52’ 00” 
Table 3.   Geographic Positions of the Vertices of Exclusion area E-2. 
 
Area E-3 includes a circular surface of 30 square nautical miles with a 
radius of 3 nautical miles, whose center lies in the position Lat. 18° 37’ 30” N and 
Long. 093° 10’ 12” W.  
As a solution, the Mexican Navy created the Sound Task Force III, whose 
mission is to carry out naval operations in the marine and coastal zones of the 
Campeche Sound in conditions of green alert. The Task Force’s purpose is to 
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prevent transgressors of the law from carrying out acts of sabotage and terrorism 
that could cause partial or total damage to the strategic marine and terrestrial 
facilities involved in the extraction and refinement of hydrocarbons. 
In a condition of green alert, the force deployment in the operational area 
consists of the following: 
 One HURACAN-class missile ship, with a shipborne helicopter, type 
PANTHER. It patrols and monitors and interdicts boats that have 
nothing to do with PEMEX activities in the areas of exclusion. 
 
 Two POLARIS-class interceptor boats, with personnel, embarked as a 
quick-reaction force, located in the city of Carmen, Campeche. Their 
mission is interception tasks, operating with the unit, class HURACAN 
or class Durango. 
 
 A POLARIS-class interceptor boat, operating from Dos Bocas, 
Tabasco. It carries out operations of interdiction in the exclusion zone 
E-3. 
 
 An E-2C HAWKEYE Airborne Early Warning Alert aircraft, for early 
alert and flight control, makes random flights and reports suspicious 
targets. 
 
 A C-212 AVIOCAR Maritime Patrol Aircraft makes random flights for 
recognition and monitoring. 
 
 An intercepting aircraft, type REDIGO, which makes flights for 
monitoring and deterrence. 
 
 One helicopter, type MI-17, allocated on one of the platforms, with 
tasks of transport and insertion of forces for immediate reaction and 
flights of recognition in the exclusion areas. 
 
C. MOTIVATION 
The thesis topic was motivated by accounts of recent terrorist attacks on 
facilities and ships similar to the situation in Mexico’s Campeche Sound, where a 
main oil facility, guarded by the Mexican Navy, could be vulnerable to attacks 
similar to those described here. In 2000, two such attacks made the Mexican 
government immediately aware of the potentially dangerous situation in the 
Sound. 
An attempt to bomb the USS THE SULLIVANS, for example, one of the 
millennium attack plots, is now widely seen as a trial run for the subsequent 
bombing in Yemen of the USS COLE. The attack failed when the bombers’ boat, 
overloaded with explosives, began to sink. The bombing of the COLE (Figure 3), 
a guided-missile destroyer, occurred on October 12, 2000. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Cole_bombing). During Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, there have also been similar cases of suicide bombers on boats 
attacking Iraq’s main oil facilities. 
 
Figure 3.   USS Cole (DDG-67) in Port Aden on the Arabian Peninsula after 
was attacked from a small craft in a terrorist act by suicide bombers. 
 
 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
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The events of 9/11 were a wake-up call for the international community. 
Mexico, like many other countries, now must take appropriate actions to prevent 
similar terrorism attacks on strategically sensitive potential targets in Mexico. It is 
necessary to take preventive measures and to increase the monitoring of vital 
facilities. The Mexican Navy has responsibility for and jurisdiction over strategic 
geographical areas in Mexico. This thesis argues for a more effective scheme of 
security to protect the critical infrastructure in the Campeche Sound with the 
resources of the Mexican Navy in the area. 
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides more information about the capabilities of the different 
units of the Mexican Navy deployed in the Campeche area, the scenarios 
explored in this thesis, and performance measures. Chapter III describes how 
these resources and scenarios are implemented in the agent-based software 
used in this thesis, Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA). Chapter IV 
describes the robust experimental design for this study, the implementation of a 
Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes crossed with a full factorial design and the 
results of the simulation. Chapter V explains the data analysis. Chapter VI 










































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
9 
II. RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONAL 
SCENARIOS IN THE AREA 
A. OVERVIEW 
This Chapter describes the capabilities and characteristics of the different 
units of the Mexican Navy deployed in the area; it describes the operational 
scenarios of the Mexican Navy, as well as their measures of effectiveness. After 
this description, it provides a background for the modeling used to investigate the 
best allocation and effective tactics of the current resources of the Mexican Navy 
and the additional resources required to enhance the surveillance in the area. 
Finally, the chapter discusses the agent-based model used in this analysis. 
 
B. MEXICAN NAVY RESOURCES IN THE AREA 
The Mexican Navy has a responsibility to provide security and a capacity 
to respond to possible threats that could come from international terrorism or 
drug trafficking in the Campeche Sound. Thus, it has created the Sound Task 
Force III mentioned in Chapter I, which has control of the operations on the 
surface, and of aerial units and marines in the area. The task force coordinates 
its security responsibilities with PEMEX. 
The task force maintains a permanent unfoldment of two HURACAN-class  
missile ships, , with a shipborne helicopter type PANTHER for monitoring the 
maritime and exclusion areas; four POLARIS-class interceptor boats, two 
deployed in the maritime prevention and exclusion areas, working in coordination 
with the ships, and one deployed in the areas E-2 and E-3; two aircraft (one E-2C 
HAWKEYE Airborne Early Warning aircraft and One C-212 AVIOCAR Maritime 
Patrol Aircraft); two MI-17 helicopters, one based in Campeche and the other on 





1. E-2C HAWKEYE Airborne Early Warning aircraft 
The E-2C HAWKEYE Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft (Figure 4) 
can detect and process simultaneously up to 600 aerial, surface, or terrestrial 
targets, at a height of 25,000 feet, from distances out to 300 km. It can operate 
by day or at night. Its capabilities are showed in Table 4. 
 
Max Speed: 260 knots 
Cruise speed:           230 knots 
Endurance: 06:00 hr 
Avionics: Doppler-ELDNS, Ins (Cains)-ASN 
92, TACAN-ARN 118, radio altimeter-
APN 171, reference of course and 
altitude; HF, VHF (aerial band). Data link 
Means of detection: Aircraft and surface detection radar with 
range of 250 nautical miles, IFF system 
Table 4.   Capabilities of the E-2C HAWKEYE AEW. 
 
This aircraft carries out activities of patrol and marine monitoring, control 
of aerial and surface targets, analysis of threats and security of the strategic 
facilities in the Campeche Sound, among others.  
 
 




2. C-212 AVIOCAR Maritime Patrol Aircraft  
The C-212 AVIOCAR Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) is used by the 
Mexican Navy for functions that include: maritime patrol and surveillance, traffic 
control, battling drug trafficking and illegal fishing, and search-and-rescue 
missions in the sea (Figure 5). In addition, eight aircraft AVIOCAR MPA are 
currently being converted to maritime patrol craft. Two have already been 
modernized in Spain; the rest are being converted in Mexico. When the 
conversion is complete, they will have an increased capacity for detection and 
identification, even in meteorologically adverse conditions and at night, thanks to 
their new mission systems, consisting of radar, monitoring aerial cameras, 
integral systems of communication, and mission consoles (Table 5). 
 
Figure 5.   C-212 AVIOCAR Maritime Patrol Aircraft. 
 
The primary mission of the aircraft is to make detection flights to provide 
an early air-alert and control of the reaction against surface targets. Secondary 
missions include the following: 
 Patrol flights, to detect and identify targets within its area of cover. 
 Determining the position, course, and speed of the targets. 
 Receiving and transmitting information about the targets, in real time, 
to other units. 
 Vectoring and controlling the intercepting units. 
 Search-and-rescue coordination. 
 Photography by radar of a defined area or even a moving object. 
Maximum Distance 1200 nm 
Endurance with maximum fuel 08 hours 
Cruise speed 150 nm 
Radar SEA VUE SV-2037 and 
camera Flir Safire II 
Radar range 123 nm 
Max number of simultaneous targets 32 (surface) 
Table 5.   Capabilities of the C-212 AVIOCAR MPA. 
 
3. HURACAN-class Missile Ship SAAR 4.5 
The two HURACAN-class missile ships (Hurricane in English) showed in 
Figure 6, recently acquired by the Mexican Navy from Israel, reach a speed of up 
to 31 knots, have a displacement of 505.9 tons, and have a flight deck to receive 
PANTHER-type helicopters. They are also equipped with technological weapons 
systems, capable of detecting any type of target in a typical range of up to 90 
nautical miles, resisting attacks and identifying targets. 
 
Figure 6.   HURACAN-class missile ship. 
 
These ships carry two kinds of antiship missiles, two twin launchers for the 
McDonnell Douglas Harpoon IC in crossover, and two pairs of outboard-angled, 
forward-facing, launchers for the IAI Gabriel II. They also carry an OTOBREDA 




4. AS 565 PANTHER Helicopter 
The AS 565 PANTHER (Figure 7) is the military version of the Dauphin, 
and is capable of transporting eight to ten commandos to a combat zone and 
providing evacuation and logistic support. It is carried on board the ships to 
improve the vessels’ observation, reconnaissance, and attack capabilities well 
beyond the range of the vessels’ systems. It has a cruising speed of 148 knots, a 
range of 440 nm, and a Browing .50 caliber CDP machinegun. 
 
Figure 7.   AS 565 PANTHER Helicopter. 
 
5. POLARIS-class Patrol Interceptor Boat 90H 
The POLARIS interceptor boat’s design is based on one developed by the 
Ministry of Defense, Sweden, and adapted to fit the needs of the Mexican Navy 
(Figure 8). The boat is made entirely of aluminum alloy. It has a .50 caliber 
machine gun, calibrated at CDP, and is able to reach speeds of more than 40 
knots by its water-propulsion jet. There are two versions: the A1, for transporting 
troops, with a capacity to transfer up to eighteen men with their battle equipment; 
and the A2, for monitoring and patrolling, with berthing for six men. 
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Figure 8.   POLARIS-class Patrol Interceptor Boat 90H. 
6. Helicopter MI-17 
The MI-17 is a multirole helicopter (Figure 9) that is used by air-assault 
infantry forces to attack at a point of penetration, reinforce units in contact, or 
disrupt counterattacks. Additional missions may include: attack, direct air- 
support, electronic warfare, airborne early-warning and search and rescue. The 
helicopter’s capabilities are shown in Table 6. 
 
Figure 9.   Helicopter MI-17. 
 
Maximum speed 250 Km/hr 
Cruising speed 200 Km/hr 
Range 1000 Km 
Radars Maritime surveillance radar 
RDR1500B (160 nm) and night 
vision system 
Armament 2 x 50 CDP machine guns 
Table 6.   Capabilities of the Helicopter MI-17. 
 
7. L-90 TP REDIGO 
The L-90 TP REDIGO (Figure 10) is a turboprop-powered military basic 
trainer aircraft. The aircraft is of conventional configuration, with retractable 
tricycle undercarriage and a low wing. As is typical with many military trainers, it 
also can carry light armament for weapons training, or potentially, for use in a 
close-support role. The aircraft’s capabilities are shown in Table 7. 
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Figure 10.   L-90 TP REDIGO 
 
Maximum speed 352 km/h (220 mph) 
Range 1,405 km (878 miles)  
Service ceiling 7,620 m (25,000 ft) 
Rate of climb 696 m/min (2,280 ft/min) 
Armament 2   50 CDP machinegun and 
2 rocket launchers 
Table 7.   Capabilities of the L-90 REDIGO. 
 
C. SCENARIO 
The term “scenario,” as used here, means a depiction of the allocation and 
patrol surveillance of the different resources of the Mexican Navy in the maritime 
protection of the strategic facilities in the Campeche Sound against terrorist fast-
boat attacks. In this area, there are always a fixed number of navy ships and 
aircraft, but given their different types of operational functions, the same types of 
resources are not always in the area at the same time. This study presents sixty 
combinations of resources, to asses the different capabilities and operational 
tactics of the various units of the Mexican Navy in the area. 
 
1. Scenario Description 
In the scenario shown in Figure 11, the red force consists of one, two, or 
three terrorist fast-boats, each of which is attempting to destroy an oil platform 
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with explosives (kamikazes). In the beginning, the red-force boats travel at the 
same speed as the fishing boats, hiding among them. If they feel that they are 
discovered, however, they increase to full speed to reach the target as quick as 
possible and escape being killed by a unit of the navy. A successful prevention of 
the small boats’ attack occurs when at least one of the navy resources intercepts 
and destroys a red-force boat within its weapon range, with no damage done to 
the strategic facilities. 
 
Figure 11.     Map of the scenario. (best viewed in color) 
 
2. Scenario Background and Initial Conditions 
This scenario takes place in the Campeche Bay. It simulates Mexican 
Navy operations to protect the infrastructure assets in the area, an expanse of 
more than 20,000 nautical square miles. 
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A HAWKEYE AEW, or AVIOCAR MPA, departs from Campeche City, 
sited in the northeast of the bay, and flies over the operational area. The crew’s 
mission is to detect any foreign object in the area, with the AVIOCAR’s maritime 
surveillance radars and provide an early-warning alert to other navy units in the 
area. The objects are classified as “unknowns.” If one of them is traveling at a 
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suspicious speed, is on a course toward the oil platforms, or penetrates the 
prevention area, another navy unit, if available, will approach the unknown and 
determine its clearance classification. 
The REDIGO aircraft and MI-17 helicopter conduct a different surveillance 
patrol above the operation area, to assure that only authorized vessels are in the 
prevention and exclusion areas. If one of the early-warning aircraft alerts them 
about a suspicious vessel, one departs from the city of Carmen, an island in the 
south on the map, and one from Campeche, in the east on the map. The rest of 
the navy units operate different patrols for the same purpose. The goal of the red 
forces is to reach and destroy at least one of the oil platforms in the vicinity.  
 
3. Constraints 
When fishing boats go into the maritime prevention area, at least one unit 
of the navy must approach them, to determine their identity as neutral vessels 
and direct them out of the prevention area. This means that one unit must spend 
time and effort on a nonenemy contact, when it needs to be prepared to 
encounter an enemy ship, if necessary. 
 
4. Measure of Effectiveness 
a. Probability of Destroying Red-forces Boats Before They 
Reach Their Goal 
Because the red forces’ goal is to destroy at least one of the oil 
platforms using different numbers of small fast-boats, their prevention depend on 
the navy’s having a correct selection of units in the area. We want to maximize 
the probability of successful prevention by selecting the best allocation of units 
and patrol patterns to deal with both the number and the speeds of the terrorist 
boats. 
 
D. WHY SIMULATION BY AGENT-BASED MODELS (ABM)? 
The military uses analytical methods and a formulation of models to find 
an optimal solution to potential attack-area problems. “However, because of 
complexity, stochastic relations, and so on, not all real-word problems can be 
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represented adequately in closed-formed models. Attempts to use analytical 
models for such systems usually require so many simplifying assumptions that 
the solutions are likely to be inferior or inadequate for implementation. Often, in 
such instances, the only alternative form of modeling and analysis available for 
the decision maker is simulation” (Winston, 2004). 
For this study, simulation is more applicable because analytical models 
may require us to make many simplifying assumptions. “Simulation may be 
defined as a technique that imitates the operation of a real-world system as it 
evolves over time. A simulation model usually takes the form of a set of 
assumptions about the operation of the system, expressed as mathematical or 
logical relations between the objects of interest of the system. The simulation 
process involves executing or running the model through time, usually on a 
computer, to generate representative samples of the measure of performance” 
(Winston, 2004). 
It would be difficult for analytical methods to simultaneous capture all the 
important factors that are involved in the scenarios presented in this study. For 
example, the probability of detection and identification, the differences in the 
speeds and number of the terrorist boats, weather and atmospheric conditions, 
as well as the enemy’s tactics. “Simulation is most often used to analyze ‘what if’ 
types of questions” (Winston, 2004). This research analyzes sixty different 
models of the Mexican Navy’s resources in the Campeche area. Their purpose is 
to detect different kinds of terrorist fast-boats. The study also analyzes the 
repercussion of these operations for fishing boats trying to penetrate the 
prevention or exclusions area for the purpose of fishing, during a possible 
incursion of terrorists’ boats.      
Because the models are small, they can be processed very quickly using 
high-performance computing capabilities. “You get a dynamic combination 
because you can look at literally thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of 
thousands, even millions of runs. You can vary the parameters, which are 
numerous because in today’s uncertain world, you’re up against so many 
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different factors. You can’t really predict anything, but if you look at enough 
possibilities, you can begin to understand” (Horne, June 2005). 
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory's Project Albert (PA) is the 
research and development effort whose goal is to develop the process and 
capabilities of data farming, a method for addressing decision-maker's questions 
that applies high-performance computing to modeling to examine and understand 
the landscape of potential simulated outcomes, enhance intuition, find surprises 
and outliers, and identify potential options. Data farming is a method by which 
potentially millions of data points are explored and captured. It could be 
considered akin to data mining combined with feedback, which allows for the 
more intelligent collection of more data points (www.projectalbert.org). 
To implement the scenario, it is necessary to use a toolkit for the data-
farming environment, in which a distillation model can be executed. In that 
environment, Project Albert has, among its suite of models, the Map Aware Non-
uniform Automata (MANA) software, developed by the New Zealand Defense 
Technology Agency, which can be used free of charge by members of the PA 
team. MANA is an agent-based model, in which the agents in the environment 
are “map aware.” This means that the agents’ situational awareness includes 
both the depicted terrain and the battle space activities in the simulation. The 
term “non-uniform” means that each agent has different behavior parameters and 
capabilities. The term “automata” means that each agent reacts independently on 
the battlefield, according to his own situational awareness. 
The next chapter describes how the specific scenario in the Campeche 
Sound is implemented using MANA, explains how each feature in MANA is 
adapted for the model, and shows how these features help to present realistic-





























III. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
This chapter describes how the key features in MANA version 3.0.39 were 
used to develop an experimental scenario of the Campeche Sound, explained in 
previous chapters. One of the multiple advantages of MANA is the user’s 
manual, which shows all its features clearly, in an understandable way (MANA: 
Map Aware Non-uniform Automata, Version 3.0, User’s Manual, July 2004). 
Therefore, this chapter is based on the manual’s descriptions, with modifications 
implemented for this specific scenario.  
 
A. MANA 
1. Using MANA 
MANA is basically a scenario-exploring model; it does not describe every 
aspect of particular military operations. When a model is implemented using 
MANA, there is no “key” that indicates that the model is working perfectly. 
Therefore, each entity in the model must be set up carefully to ensure that they 
behave according the user’s specifications. Since MANA explores the greatest 
range of possible outcomes with the least set-up time, it is often only necessary 
to have simple rules of behavior to achieve the desired results. 
 
2. MANA Versus Other Agent-Based Combat Models 
MANA is used primarily as a distillation tool, that is, to create a button-up 
abstraction of a scenario that captures only the essence of a situation and avoids 
unessential details. MANA builds on and complements the earlier 
ISAAC/EINSTEIN CA models developed by the Center of Naval Analysis 
( HTUwww.cna.orgUTH), and the now discontinued Archimedes model that was being 
designed for the U.S. Marine Corps. MANA explores additional key concepts that 
ISAAC did not explore at that time, in particular: 
 Situational Awareness: Two types of situational awareness maps: a 
squad map that holds direct squad-contact memory and an inorganic 




 Communications: Allows the communication of contact sightings 
between squads. 
 
 Terrain map: Contains terrain features such as roads that agents can 
follow. 
 
 Waypoints: Can define a set of waypoints, not merely the final goal. 
 
 Event-driven personality changes: Different events can trigger squads 
with varying personality sets, which last for a user specified amount of 
time. 
 
B. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION IN MANA 
1. Battlefield 
The battlefield used here in MANA is a snapshot of the nautical chart N.O. 
28260 “East coast of the Campeche Bay,” published by the Investigation and 
Development Direction of the Mexican Navy. The chart is modified first, in a 
bitmap editor with different colors, depending on the type of terrain. For instance, 
in this study we use land, sea, preventive area, exclusion area and, territorial 
sea.  
 
Figure 12.     Screen of the Scenario Map Editor. (best viewed in color) 
This is done because agents in MANA recognize types of terrain and, by 
this method, the ability of the agents to enter certain regions of the map can be 
controlled. Next, the chart is imported into MANA as a terrain file, as shown in 
Figure 12. The original chart starts at the geographical position 19° 20’ N, 091° 
25’ W and finishes at 20° 15’ N, 093° 20’ W, indicating 175 x 115 nautical miles 
(nm) of parallels and meridians, respectively. The default battlefield in MANA is a 
200 x 200 grid of cells, but to get a better resolution of the scenario, the number 
of cells is 875 for the X axes or parallels and 625 for the Y axes or meridians: this 
means that there are five cells for each nautical mile, or each cell covers 400 x 
400 yards. To configure the settings of the battlefield, we use the option “Edit 
Battlefield” in the setup option of the menu bar of MANA. The battlefield settings 
of the scenario are shown in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13.   Screen of the MANA Battlefield Settings. (best viewed in color) 
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The map scale is changed with the values as previously explained; the 
contact aggregation radius also is changed to one (1) to help to improve the 
speed of the model and to prevent unnecessary clutter on the map. All other 
selections are at their default values. 
 
2. Squads 
According to the MANA user’s manual, version 3.0.37, a squad is a group 
of agents sized between 0 and 1000. The agents in a squad share the same 
properties and can switch between states either individually or as a group.  Table 


























2 Enemy 3 Red 1 3
1 Interceptor in Dos Bocas 1 Blue
3 Hurricane Ex 1 Blue
4 Interceptor in Cayo Arcas 1 Blue
5 Interceptor area E-2 2 Blue
6 Radar 1 Blue
7 Radar 1 Blue
8 Radar 1 Blue
9 Radar 1 Blue
10 Radar 1 Blue
11 Radar 1 Blue
12 Radar 1 Blue
13 Service vessels 50 Neutral
14 Fishing ships 100 Neutral
15 Interceptor in platform 1 Blue
16 Aircraft Aviocar C-212 1 Blue
17 Target 1 1 Blue
18 Target 2 1 Blue
19 Target 3 1 Blue
20 Helicopter Ixtoc 1 Blue
21 Helicopter Patrolling 1 Blue
22 Aircraft Redigo 1 Blue
23 Aircraft E-2C 1 Blue
24 Hurricane MP 1 Blue
25 Renegate Fishing ships 5 Neutral
26 Helicopter Hurricane Ex 1 Blue




Table 8.   Squads in the model. 
To add or edit the squad properties, we use the “Edit Squad Properties” 
under the Setup menu. This is MANA’s most important feature, both because all 
the squads in the model are added in this screen and because here is where 
their behavior is defined. In the menu at the top of the screen, each button opens 
a different screen (Figure 14) that works to edit a different property of the squad. 
The General button, includes the name of the squad, number of agents in the 
squad, whether the squad is active or not, and other miscellaneous options that 
generally remain constant. Near the bottom of the screen are six buttons that 
allow us to delete, copy or save a squad or save all the squads, so as to use 
them with the same properties in the same simulation or in another model.  
 
Figure 14.   Screen of the General Properties under the “Edit Squad Properties” 
menu. (best viewed in color) 
 
In this model, there are twenty-seven squads (Table 8), representing all 
the agents involved in the scenario, some of them with the same properties. 
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The Map button allows a user to assign the squad to areas on the map, to 
set “home” locations for each squad, and to set waypoints for each group of 
squads. Figure 15 shows a sample screen setting the home position of a squad 
and the waypoints of its patrol area. Each squad has a different home position 
and different waypoints, depending on its role in the simulation. 
 
Figure 15.   Screen of the Map properties under the “Edit Squad Properties” 
menu. (best viewed in color) 
 
The Personality (properties) screen is where the personality of each entity 
in the simulation is created. This is done basically by “weightings”: each 
personality is described by a weighting that can be varied by a scrollbar between 
-100 to 100. The higher the value the greater the attraction; the more negative 
the value the greater the repulsion. The weighting factors can cause the entities 
to react to other entities, waypoints, terrain, and information on the Situational 
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Awareness map. One of the advantages of MANA over other similar agent-based 
combat models is the event-driven personality changes. Events such as an 
enemy contact, a squad injured or refueled by enemy can all trigger a different 
personality set that lasts for a user specified amount of time. Each new state 
allows a new, different personality for a squad. 
 
Figure 16.   Screen of the Personality properties under the “Edit Squad 
Properties” menu. (best viewed in color) 
Figure 16, shows the default personality of one interceptor boat in the 
simulation. The personality settings are according to the location from which the 
information is coming. The personality screen is divided into three sections: 
Agent Situational Awareness (SA), which refers to the information that the agent 
itself has gathered; Squad SA, which refers to the shared memory map 
maintained by the agent’s parent squad; and Inorganic SA, which refers to 
information shared by other squads using communications links explained later in 
the thesis. The red values are values that were changed from their original 
values. Almost all the blue agents in the simulation have the same default 
personality. An enemy weight of 60 means that the agent has a propensity of 60 
out of 100 to go to any enemy ship that appears in its agent-situational-
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awareness. The negative value -25 for Uninjured Friends is because we do not 
want two or more blue squads to be together at the same time. Each squad has 
its own respective patrol area. Thus, when one squad goes to an enemy, the 
other blue agents do not have to go at the same time. That is, there is a built-in 
repulsion among them. A neutral propensity of 20 and Next waypoint of 45 
makes it more important for a ship, say, to continue its patrol than to move to a 
classified neutral ship. All the other weights retain their original values.  
The trigger states for all the blue agents are almost the same: Squad SA 
enemy 1, 2, and 3 and Inorganic SA enemy 1, 2, and 3. For each of these trigger 
states, there is a different personality for the agents. Figure 17 shows the 
different personality of the same interceptor boat in a different state. The trigger 
state in this example is an Inorganic SA enemy 3, which means that, when the 
agent is alerted by a friendly squad about an enemy threat 3, it has a propensity 
of 80 to go to an enemy threat 3. If there is an enemy threat 2 in the same SA 
area, to go toward it with a lesser propensity of 60. The negative value -25 
occurs for the same reason explained previously. 
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Figure 17.    Screen of the Personality properties different of the default state 
under the “Edit Squad Properties” menu. (best viewed in color) 
The personality of the red agents is to go to their next waypoints (targets) 
with a propensity of 70 out of 100. In the default state, red agents are threat 2 
and hide among the fishing boats, with the same speed as the boats in order to 
be concealed. The trigger states are an enemy contact and refueled by enemy 1. 
In case of enemy contact, when an enemy blue agent is close to them, the red 
agents increase to full speed to go toward their targets, because this means they 
have been discovered. In the case of refueled by enemy 1, it is a simple 
modeling trick to increase the red agents speed, because they have not been 
discovered by any blue agents and are entering the maritime prevention area. 
For each personality’s squad properties, the values of the squad property 
Ranges are dependent on the current squad state. The window shown in Figure 
18 shows the ranges property of a blue agent. Here we can set the capabilities of 
the sensors, and the movement speed, fuel rate, concealment, threat levels, and 
the particular icon for each agent. This window also introduces the capabilities of 
each blue agent, as was explained in Chapter II. 
 
Figure 18.   Screen of the Ranges properties under the “Edit Squad Properties” 
menu. (best viewed in color) 
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Each squad has up to four weapons available, and most of the parameters 
for each weapon are able to change with a trigger state. The screen in Figure 19 
shows the Weapons editing panel. The kinetic Energy/Agent SA was the one 
selected for all the blue agents, changing the Range to Shooter depending on the 
agent and type of weapon. In the Protect Contact Type box, we selected “to 
protect self, squad friends, other friends neutral and unknowns” for all the blue 
squads. The red squads use a high-explosive-style weapon with a short range to 
shooter, because they are kamikaze boats trying to explode the weapon as close 
as possible to one of the oil platforms. 
 
Figure 19.   Screen of the Weapons properties under the “Edit Squad 
Properties” menu. (best viewed in color) 
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The Squad SA (Figure 20) controls the flow of the situational awareness 
within the squad and does not vary with the trigger states; all the agents in the 
simulation retain their original parameters.  
 
Figure 20.   Screen of the Squad SA properties under the “Edit Squad 
Properties” menu. (best viewed in color) 
 
The Inorganic SA panel controls the flow of situational awareness among 
squads using communication links as carriers of information. The parameters of 
this panel do not vary with the trigger states. In the model, almost all the blue 
squads have communication among them; Figure 21 shows a screen where a 
given squad has communication with the number of squads shown in the table.  
The parameters changed are “Reliability,” with 100%, and “Delivery,” with 
guarantee delivered in all the cases. The final option indicates the type of contact 
information to pass over the link. 
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Figure 21.   Screen of the Inorganic SA properties under the “Edit Squad 
Properties” menu. (best viewed in color) 
Table 9 shows the contact types to pass as messages on the link. In the 
model, all the blue agents use the “FUNETC” option, except the aircraft to which 
they also have to send their position. 
 
S Share positions of own agents 
F Share details of friendly contacts 
U Share details of unclassified contacts 
N Share details of neutral contacts 
E Share details of enemy contacts 
T Share Squad’s Local Situational Awareness 
C Share Inorganic Situational Awareness 
Table 9.   Contact types to send on link. 
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The Algorithm panel (Figure 22) is used to change some of the movement 
algorithm options. All the agents in the model, except the aircraft, use the 
Stephan Algorithm (default) and the aircrafts use the Path Following algorithm; 
this is done because this algorithm is better for modeling the motion of aircrafts 
on maritime patrol. 
 
Figure 22.   Screen of the Movement Algorithm parameters under the “Edit 
Squad Properties” menu. (best viewed in color) 
 
3. Measure of Effectiveness in MANA 
There is a Data Output Menu in MANA, which has options for recording 
extra information in addition to the standard MultiRun file. The output options 
available for this version are: record step-by-step data, record casualty-location 
data, record agent-state data, record detections, record Multi-Contact detections, 
and record positions. The MultiRun standard result file of this version of MANA 
contains different measures: for example, for each run, the random seed used, 
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the number of casualties for allegiance one and two, whether or not allegiance 
one or two reach final waypoints, and the casualties of each squad. For this 
study, additional output files are not necessary to get the measure of 
effectiveness explained in chapter two. It is only necessary to get the mean of the 
number of times the targets (i.e., critical petroleum facilities) are killed in each 
run, and afterwards, to calculate in a spreadsheet the probability that at least one 






































IV. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
Multiple scenarios could develop in the Campeche Sound, depending on 
the navy’s resources in the area and the enemy force’s capabilities. Some of the 
navy resources in the area are fixed: they never change. But there are others 
that sometimes are not the same. This occurs because the navy has more than 
one operation to perform. Another reason is the maintenance plan of the units. 
Nevertheless, if a certain type unit is not able to be there, it will be replaced by an 
equal type unit or by another type unit with similar characteristics. This chapter 
explains the two main factor classes involved in the experiments, controllable 
factors and noise factors, and the robust design that best explores the 
parameters of the model.  
 
A. MEXICAN NAVY SCENARIOS - CONTROLLABLE FACTORS 
For the purpose of this study, the factors that the Mexican Navy can 
control include all the different combinations of the actual resources in the 
Campeche Sound. It may seem obvious that if the number of the navy resources 
in the area were augmented, then the probability that an enemy would destroy at 
least one oil platform would be lessened. Nevertheless, this study tries to find the 
best combination of resources at the lowest cost.  The controllable factors are the 
different combinations possible in the area by interchanging the various elements 
and practices of the overall navy force: 
 Presence of the HAWKEYE AEW. 
 
 Presence of the AVIOCAR MPA. 
 
 Aerial patrol by aircraft, type REDIGO, or helicopter, MI-17. 
 
 Patrol area of a HURACAN ship. 
 




Using a full factorial design (Law and Kelton, 2000) is an effective way to 
evaluate the possible combinations of the naval resources in the area. The 
presence of the various units is expressed as the binary values 0 and 1. Zero, if a 
certain unit is not present in the simulation and one otherwise. In the beginning, 
we considered all the possible combinations of the resources, but a preliminary 
analysis showed that the factor of an aerial patrol by an aircraft type REDIGO or 
a helicopter MI-17 was not relevant in the model. This does not mean that they 
are not necessary in the simulation. It means that, with either of those aerial 
types, the result in the simulation is the same. Appendix one shows the data 
analysis of this preliminary finding. Table 10 shows the final, most important 
combinations of the naval factors. 
 















0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 1 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 0 
Table 10.   Full factorial design of the possible scenarios of the navy resources 
in the area, with only the controllable factors. 
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In addition, the study analyzes the effect on the output of incorporating 
one or two additional intercepting boats in the area. Therefore, the total number 
of possible scenarios with the controllable factors is 60 (20 x 3). 
 
B. ENEMY CAPABILITIES - NOISE FACTORS 
There are some factors that are not controllable by the navy, for instance, 
the number of terrorist boats, speed of the boats, types of boats, tactics, weather, 
number of fishing boats entering the forbidden area, etc. For this study, we 
considered only three uncontrollable factors: number of terrorist boats, the speed 
of those boats, and the number of fishing ships entering the forbidden area. In 
this study the enemy has only one tactic, because the tactic considered for this 
model is a worst-case example. A different tactic would add more reaction time 
for the navy units in the area.  
Latin Hypercubes and Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes provide a very 
good, all-purpose design, particularly when the factors used are quantitative. The 
reason this is so is due to their efficiency, space-filling ability (if we look at any 
pair of factors, we find a variety of combinations), design flexibility, and analysis 
flexibility. The Latin Hypercubes are efficient designs for examining the impact of 
simultaneously changing the specified factor values (Kleijnen, Sanchez, Lucas, 
and Cioppa, 2005). The Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (OLH) design was chosen 
for its excellent space-filling properties, the resulting lack of correlation between 
factors’ inputs, and the ability to identify nonlinear relationships (Cioppa, 2002). 
OLH can be used to design an experiment evaluation with seven factors, at 
seventeen levels each. A NOLH design with almost the same properties, but 
slightly more correlation between factors, can be used to evaluate from eight to 
twenty-two factors, at up to 129 levels. Therefore, for the noise-factor design we 
used an Orthogonal Latin Hypercube design with three factors, requiring only 17 
runs. The construction of the OLH design was done in the Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet created by Professor Susan Sanchez (SEED Lab, NPS, 2005). An 
example of the design in that spreadsheet is shown in Figure 23. The user must 
first choose the appropriate worksheet, depending on the number of factors, and 
then fill out the low level and the high level and name of each factor. The 
spreadsheet will create the design in the light-yellow entries. Table 11 shows the 
low and high levels of the three noise factors used in the simulation. 
 








Number of terrorist boats 1  3  
Speed terrorist boats 20 knots 29 45 knots 64 
Number fishing ships in 
the forbidden area 
0  5  
Table 11.   Low and high levels of the controllable factors. 
 
 
Figure 23.   Screen of the NOLH spreadsheet design. (best viewed in color) 
 
Table 12 shows the correlation matrix of the noise factors in the OLH 
design. The correlation of the number of terrorist boats with the speed of the 
terrorist boats is 0.11. This is because the factor of the number of terrorist boats 
has only three levels and therefore there is some rounding.  
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  Number terrorists    Speed of terrorist Fishing boats 
Number terrorists 1.00000000 0.11685718 0.07753364 
 
Speed of terrorist 0.11685718 1.00000000 0.05068842 
 
Fishing boats 0.07753364 0.05068842 1.00000000 
 
Table 12.   Correlation matrix of the noise factor in the OLH design. 
 
The pairwise projections of the 17-runs, three-factor orthogonal hypercube 
of the noise factors is shown in Figure 24. This shows the near orthogonality and 
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0 1 2 3 4 5  
Figure 24.   Screen of the pairwise projections of the 3 factors in the OLH 
design. 
C. FINAL EXPERIMENTAL FACTORS 
The final design includes the twenty design points of the possible 
scenarios of the controllable factors, crossed with the seventeen design points of 
the OLH design of the uncontrollable factors, and finally crossed with the single 
39 
40 
controllable factor with three levels from the effect of using zero, one or two 
interceptors in the area. The result is 20 times 17 times 3 = 1,020 design points. 
Finally, the 1,020 design points are sent to the Maui High Performance Computer 
Center (MHPCC), to run fifty iterations each, with a total of 51,000 MANA runs of 



































































Figure 25.   Scheme of the representation of the final experimental design. 
 
This experimental design took a little more than twenty-four hours to run at 
the MHPCC, a time that is not comparable to the time it would take to run the 
same scenario in the traditional full factorial design. In the full factorial design it 
would be necessary to have at least 60,000 runs, which is almost sixty times 
more runs than the experimental design. Therefore, the time to complete the 




V. DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter explains the initial assessment of the data followed by a 
detailed analysis of the data. The analysis includes the critical factors in the 
model, a linear regression model with all the main effects and the two-way 
interactions of all the factors, and the linear regression model with only the 
controllable factors (Mexican Navy resources). Finally, we explain in detail all the 
analysis findings in the model, not only in statistical terms, but also in terms of 
what this means in real life in each particular scenario.  
 
A. INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE DATA  
When the experimental design is processed and completed at the Maui 
High Performance Computing Center (MHPCC), a comma-separated values 
(CSV) text file is generated by the MHPCC cluster with all the inputs of the 
experimental design and the desired MOEs. Next, thanks to the data-farming 
environment output, the desired information is extracted from the simulation 
model. The CSV file, in this case, has all of the 1,020 input combinations 
explained in the previous chapter, along with data such as blue casualties, red 
casualties, blue injured, and red injured, among others. For this particular MOE 
(explained in chapter two), we need the number of targets killed (i.e., the critical 
platforms). The probability that an individual target has been destroyed is 
estimated by simply adding the times a target is killed in a particular scenario and 
dividing by the number of iterations (fifty). Then, having three targets, we 
calculate the MOE (i.e., the probability that at least one platform is destroyed out 
of the three) for each scenario. The JMP Statistical Discovery Software, version 
5.1.2, was used as a primary tool for data processing and data analysis. Figure 
26 shows the distribution of the probability to destroy each platform and the 
probability to destroy at least one platform. A probability of kill 1, 2, or 3 means 
the probability that the enemy destroyed critical platform number 1, 2, or 3 
respectively. We should mention that, if there is only one terrorist boat, it will 
attack critical platform number 1; if there are two boats, one will attack separate 
critical platform number 1, and the other will attack platform number 2; and, 
finally, if there are 3 boats, each of them will attack a different critical platform in 
the model. The probability of kill at least one, refers to the probability that any of 
the terrorist boats destroys successfully at least one of the critical platforms.  
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Figure 26.   Distribution of the probability of the enemy destroying each of the 
critical platforms and the probability of the enemy destroying at least 
one of them. (best viewed in color) 
 
B. CRITICAL FACTORS IN THE FULL MODEL  
This section identifies the critical factors that, in general, affect all the 
scenarios. It starts with a partition tree of the data, followed by a one-way 
analysis of the contribution of each individual factor in the model. In the one-way 
analysis, because of the absence of normality, a non-parametric test is used to 
test the null hypothesis in the tests.  
 
1. Classification Tree 
This feature is used to fit classification and regression trees. The partition 
algorithm recursively partitions the data according to a relationship between X 
and Y values, creating a partition tree (JMP version 5.1.2, 2004). This technique 
is usually used in data mining, because: 
42 
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 It is good for exploring relationships without having a good prior model, 
 It handles large problems easily, and 
 The results are very interpretable. 
The response column (Y’s) in this case is the probability that at least one 
platform is destroyed. The factors columns (X’s) are all the resources of the navy 
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Figure 27.   Partition tree feature in JMP version 5.1.2 including all the factors in 
the model. 
The partition tree feature in JMP version 5.1.2 is shown in Figure 27. The 
goal of this analysis if to investigate which factors affect the response variable, 
which in this case is the probability to destroy at least one platform in all the 
scenarios. The first split shows the most important factor, which in this case is 
the speed of the terrorist boats. This means that there is a significant effect on 
the response when the speed of the terrorist boats is greater than 38 knots (55 in 
MANA). The second split splits each of the groups previously generated in the 
first split, and so on. For instance, if the speed of the terrorist boats is greater 
than 38 knots, it is essential to have the HAWKEYE present in the scenarios to 
decrease the probability, if this was not possible, to have the maritime patrol 
aircraft in the area. 
2. One-way Analysis of Critical Factors 
The one-way analysis of means is the attribution and test that part of the 
total variability in a response is due to the difference in mean responses among 
the factor groups. 
a. E-2C HAWKEYE AEW 
Figure 28 shows the effect of the contribution of the E-2C 
HAWKEYE AEW aircraft in the scenarios. The two boxplots are the vertical 
distribution of the response points for each factor of X (E-2C HAWKEYE AEW). 
In this case the factors are zero if the HAWKEYE AEW is not present in the 
scenario and one otherwise. The boxplots show clearly that the means and 
variances of the probability of kill at least one platform are different. The mean of 
not having the HAWKEYE AEW in the scenario is 0.17, while the mean of having 
the HAWKEYE AEW in the scenario is 0.03. A t-test t is not necessary to show 
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Figure 28.   One-way analysis of means of the probability of destroying at least 




b. C-212 AVIOCAR MPA 
The AVIOCAR MPA has almost the same effect in the model as the 
HAWKEYE AEW. Figure 29 shows the one-way analysis of the effect of the 
AVIOCAR MPA in the scenarios. The absence of normality in the data led to a 
decision to use the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank (rank-sum) test to 
examine the hypothesis. The null hypothesis in the test is that the means are 
equal. The p-values are the ‘Prob>|Z| .0002’ entry in Figure 29 and the 
‘Prob>ChSq .002.’ This is because we have only a two-level factor (0 and 1). 
Given that the value of alpha is .05 (α = 0.05), the null hypothesis is false (α > 
Prob>|Z|). With this test we can conclude that there is a difference in the means 
for the probability to destroy at least one platform when the AVIOCAR MPA is 
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Figure 29.   One-way analysis of means of the probability of destroying at least 




c. Patrolling Area of the HURACAN Ship  
The simulation tests the two possible patrolling areas of the 
HURACAN ship: the exclusion area and the maritime prevention area. In this 
case, the one-way analysis considers the two patrol areas both with and without 
the shipborne helicopter on the ship. The blue line connects the means of the five 
situations. Table 13 shows the four different possible patrol areas of the 
HURACAN ship, both with and without the shipborne helicopter, and one 
additional scenario just to check the effect on the probability to destroy at least 
one platform without the HURACAN ship in the model. 
 
Number Area patrolling 
0 Effect of no HURACAN ship in the model 
1 Exclusion area 
2 Exclusion area with shipborne helicopter 
3 Maritime prevention area 
4 Maritime prevention area with shipborne helicopter 
Table 13.   Possible patrol areas of the HURACAN ship in the model. 
 
Figure 30 shows the means of the probability of destroying at least 
one platform for all five levels in Table 13. In all cases, the null hypothesis is that 
the means are equal. Since the p-value ‘Prob>ChSq’ is 0.0185, the null 
hypothesis is false with an alpha value (significance level) of 0.05 (α = 0.05). The 
non-parametric Median test (k-sample median) in the JMP 5.1.2 entry in Figure 
30 also shows that the “Mean-Mean0/Std0’ of both patrol areas with the 
shipborne helicopter (2 and 4) are negative, which means that they are different 
from the other three patrol areas. Therefore, we can conclude that the patrol area 
of the HURACAN ship is a significant factor in the model only when the HURACAN 
has the shipborne helicopter. This makes sense because the shipborne 
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Figure 30.   One-way analysis of the means of the probability of destroying at 
least one platform by the patrolling of the area with the HURACAN-class 
Missile Ship. 
 
d. Additional Interceptor Boats class POLARIS in the 
Scenario 
The twenty different scenarios are tested with the possible addition 
of 0, 1, or 2 POLARIS interceptor boats in the scenarios. Figure 31 shows the 
one-way analysis of the probability to destroy at least one platform with the 
addition of 0, 1, or 2 interceptor fast boats in the area. At first glance, we see that 
there is no difference in the means. The p-value ‘Prob>ChSq’ is 0.6647 with an 
alpha value of 0.05, which means that we do not reject the null hypothesis that 
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the means are equal. Even though the null hypothesis test is that they are equal, 
the Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the probability of destroying at 
least one platform, when one or two interceptors are added in the scenarios, is 
slightly different than with no additional interceptors. We can conclude that there 
is no difference when adding one or two additional interceptors in the scenarios, 
but there is a difference between adding and not adding. This is because, when 
two interceptor fast boats are added, one of them covers a different area, where 
the terrorist boats are. So we can conclude that there is a difference from adding 
one interceptor boat in the model only if its covering area is involved when a 
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Figure 31.   One-way analysis of the means, with additional POLARIS 




e. Number and Speed of Terrorist Boats 
As we expected, increasing the number and speed of the terrorist 
boats increases the probability to destroy at least one platform. A non-parametric 
test to see if the means are different is not necessary. Figure 32 shows that the 
probability to destroy at least one platform is increased as the number and speed 
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Figure 32.   One-way analysis of the means, by number and speed of the 
terrorist boats, of the probability of destroying at least one platform.  
 
f. Fishing Boats Entering the Forbidden Area During a 
Terrorist Attack 
In the model an excursion of fishing ships is simulated entering the 
maritime prevention area during an attack by terrorist boats. This is because, 
whenever an unknown ship enters the maritime prevention area, at least one 
navy unit has to recognize this ship and “push it away” from the area. This would 
make the unit unable to go to the real target during an incursion of terrorist boats. 
Figure 33 shows the repercussion in the response variable when zero to five 
fishing boats enter the maritime prevention area during an attack by terrorist 
boats. The p-value in the ChiSquare approximation ‘Prob>ChSq’ is 0.001, which 
means that the null hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected. The 
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Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Walls test in Figure 33 indicates that the means when there is 
zero, one or three fishing ships are equal. This is because the data of the number 
of fishing ships entering the forbidden area and the number and speed of the 
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Figure 33.   One-way analysis of the probability of destroying at least one 
platform as a function of the number of fishing ships entering the 
prevention area during a terrorist attack. 
Table 14 shows the values of the NOLH design of the number of 
terrorist boats, the speed of the terrorist boats, and the number of fishing boats 
entering the forbidden area. The values highlighted are the values when there 
are three fishing boats entering the maritime prevention area. When there are 
three fishing boats, the maximum speed of the terrorist boats is 37 knots (53 in 
MANA), but there is only one terrorist boat, so the probability to destroy at least 
one platform is small. Therefore in this case, the probability of destroying at least 
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one platform when there are three fishing boats should be small. This is because, 
when the speed of the terrorist boats is slightly greater, there are only one or two 
terrorist boats. When there are three attackers, their speed is sufficiently slow 
that they can be interdicted by the Navy units. Excluding the mean value of three 
fishing boats, we can conclude that there is a critical effect on the probability of 
destroying at least one platform when there are more than two fishing boats 
entering the maritime prevention area during a terrorist boat attack.  
low level 1 29 0
high level 3 64 5








 2 64 4
 1 38 4
 1 44 0
 1 51 2
 3 62 2
 3 40 2
 2 36 5
 2 60 4
 2 47 3
 2 29 1
 3 55 1
 3 49 5
 3 42 3
 2 31 3
 1 53 3
 2 57 0
 2 33 1
Table 14.   NOLH design of the number of terrorist boats, speed of the terrorist 
boats, and number of fishing boats entering forbidden area. 
 
3. Regression 
A stepwise regression was performed to examine the relationship of the 
controllable factors and the noise factors. Stepwise regression is a method of 
selecting factors with significant effects for a regression model. The purpose of a 
regression in this case is to find a mathematical equation that fits the data output 
in the simulation. The stepwise regression produced in JMP 5.1.2 is shown in 
Figure 34. The mathematical equation shown provides an explanation of the 
response (the probability of destroying at least one platform), based on the 
significant factors that result in a minimal amount of error. The final model in 
Figure 34 is the one that better provides parameter estimates for the significant 
factors that result in the most preferred R-squared value, 87.7%, and an adjusted 
R-Squared value of 86.9%. By definition, “R-Squared” is the proportion of 
variability in the response explained by the regressor X (Montgomery, Peck and 
Vining, 2001). Values of R-Squared that are close to 1 imply that most of the 
variability in the response is explained by the regression model.  
RSquare
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(E-2C-0.5)*(Number of terrorist boats-2.05882)




(Aviocar-0.5)*(Number of terrorist boats-2.05882)
(Aviocar-0.5)*(Speed of the terrorist boats-46.5294)
(Hurricane Ex_He-0.2)*(Number of terrorist boats-2.05882)
(Hurricane Ex_He-0.2)*(Speed of the terrorist boats-46.5294)
(Hurricane MP-0.4)*(Speed of the terrorist boats-46.5294)
(Hurricane MP_He-0.2)*(Number of terrorist boats-2.05882)
(Hurricane MP_He-0.2)*(Speed of the terrorist boats-46.5294)
(additional Interceptors-1)*(Speed of the terrorist boats-46.5294)
(Number of terrorist boats-2.05882)*(Speed of the terrorist boats-46.5294)









































































































































Figure 34.   Regression model with all the factors involved in the scenarios. 
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The third column of the right side of Figure 34 contains t-Ratio information. 
The t-Ratio is the ratio of the value estimated by the model formula to its 
standard error. A t-Ratio greater than 2 (in absolute value) corresponds to a 
significance of less 5%. (Sall et al., 2005) The absolute magnitude of the t-Ratio 
indicates the relative influence a factor has on the outcome of the probability of 
destroying at least one platform. The “40.82” for “E-2C” is the largest value in the 
table and thus has the most statistical significance in explaining the probability of 
destroying at least one platform. The negative sign indicates that there exists a 
negative correlated relationship (i.e., as “E-2C HAWKEYE AEW” is not present in 
the model, the probability of destroying at least one platform value produced in 
the simulation increases). This is contrasted with the second highest magnitude 
value of “37.78” for “Speed of the terrorist boats.” However, in the case of “Speed 
of the terrorist boats,” the relationship is positive correlated (i.e., as “Speed of the 
terrorist boats increases, the probability of destroying at least one platform also 
increases). Inspection of the remaining values yields an understanding of how 
the factors influence the probability of destroying at least one platform relative to 
one another.   
This model makes sense. As all the Navy resources are in the model, the 
probability of destroying at least one platform decreases. Conversely, as the 
number of terrorist boats, speed of the terrorist boats, and fishing ships entering 
forbidden area, the probability of destroying at least one platform increases. The 
interaction terms indicate the significant relationships between one factor and 
another. The most important significant interactions terms in the model are going 
to be explained later in this chapter.  
We plot the probability of destroying at least one platform against the 
predicted probability, and also the residuals against the predicted probability, to 
destroy at least one platform. Figure 35, left side, displays the actual vs. the 
predicted probability of destroying at least one platform. From the actual vs. 
predicted probability of destroying at least one platform plot, we can see a 
positive slope, indicating that the actual and the predicted probability of 
destroying at least one platform are in general agreement. To check the 
assumption of normality for the residuals, we plotted the residuals against the 
predicted probability of destroying at least one platform, displayed in Figure 35, 
right side.  In this plot, we want the residuals to have a mean of zero, constant 
variance and identically distributed. The plot looks good except, in the marked 
ellipse, there is a trend in the data when the predicted probability to destroy at 
least one platform is -0.15 to 0.15. This is because almost all the controllable 
factors are binary variables (zero and one) and the noise factors, excepting the 
speed of the terrorist boats, have only a few levels (3 and 5), and also because 
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Figure 35.   Actual vs. Predicted Probability to destroy at least one platform and 
Residual vs. Predicted Probability to destroy at least one platform. 
 
4. Significant Interactions 
In our model there are twenty statistically significant interactions between 
factors, but there are only eleven that are practically significant. Figure 36 shows 
the twenty-one interaction plots of the seven most important factors. We used the 
interaction profiles plot of JMP 5.1.2 to examine the interactions more closely. 
The plot itself shows the seven terms in the model that have significant 
interactions. An “interaction” means a change in the response (the probability of 
destroying at least one platform), caused by varying one parameter that is 
dependent upon another parameter. The interaction plot of Figure 36 shows the 
high and low levels of the factor in the row, and the trend in the probability of 
54 
destroying at least one platform, by changing the factor in the column. The 
diagonal is a mirror where the axes are reversed. For example, the bottom left 
and upper right show the interaction between the E-2C HAWKEYE AEW and the 
speed of the terrorist boats. In the upper right version the high and low values of 
the E-2C (0 and 1) are each shown, with the trend in the probability to destroy at 
least one platform, as the speed of the terrorist boats changes. In the lower left 
version, the high and low values of the speed of the terrorist boats are shown 
with a trend in the probability to destroy at least one platform, as the E-2C 
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Figure 36.   Interaction plot of the most significance factors in the model. (best 
viewed in color) 
 
Notice in the graph (Figure 36) that there are interactions where the 
change in the response is more dramatic. For example, the interaction between 
the E-2C HAWKEYE AEW and the speed of the terrorist boats, AVIOCAR MPA, 
and the number of terrorist boats, and the interaction between the number of 
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terrorist boats and the speed of the terrorist boats. In the first example, 
interpreting this into real-world terms means that the probability of destroying at 
least one platform when the speed of the terrorist boats is very fast is 
dramatically less when the E-2C HAWKEYE AEW is present in the scenario. 
Also, the AVIOCAR MPA adds nothing in presence of the E-2C HAWKEYE 
AEW. Another important example is the interaction between the number of the 
terrorist boats and the speed of the terrorist boats in the bottom right of the 
graph. In operational terms, it means that the probability of destroying at least 
one platform is increased when both the speed of the terrorist boats is very fast 
and the number of terrorist boats is more than one. Conversely, when the speed 
of the terrorist boats is slow (20 knots), the probability of destroying at least one 
platform keeps almost constant, no matter the number of terrorist boats. 
 
C. CRITICAL CONTROLLABLE FACTORS  
Because the Mexican Navy has a 24/7 operation in the Campeche Sound, 
protecting this critical area, and sometimes there is no detailed intelligence report 
of enemy capabilities and courses of actions (COA), it is necessary to have a 
deployment of resources that better controls for the possible enemy capabilities 
and COAs. The possible capabilities of the enemy for this study are the NOLH 
design of the noise factors explained in chapter three. To do this, we created 
another table with all the possible combinations of the controllable factors along 
with the mean of the probability to destroy at least one factor of the seventeen 
combinations of the noise factors. The analysis of this data includes a partition 
tree and a stepwise linear regression model of the critical controllable factors. 
 
1. Partition Tree of the Controllable Factors 
Figure 37 shows a regression tree of the data considering only partitions 
of the controllable factors (resources of the navy). This tree has a different 



































































































































Figure 37.   Partition tree of the controllable factors in the model. 
 
Interpreting the model is simple. Factors at the top (left) of the tree are the 
most important. Splits to the top are for improvements for the MOE, because the 
probability of destroying at least one platform is decreased. To use the tree as a 
prediction tool, we read the tree from left to right, following the appropriate 
branches (units of the navy) for the case being considered. So, for a particular 
scenario, we follow the branches of the units present in the area, and in the final 
branch, we can get the mean and standard deviation of the probability of 
destroying at least one platform. As stated in the full scenario, the most critical 
controllable factor is the presence of the E-2C HAWKEYE AEW, followed by the 
AVIOCAR MPA and the area patrolling of the HURACAN ship with shipborne 




The regression of the controllable factors includes the most important 
factors mentioned in the partition tree section. Because the factors are binary 
numbers (0 if the unit is not present in the scenario, and 1 otherwise), the model 
cannot include quadratic effects and because there is a good fit, it is not 
necessary to add interactions between the factors. Therefore, the regression is a 
linear regression model with the four most important controllable factors. Figure 
38 shows the linear regression model of the most important controllable factors in 
the sixty possible scenarios.  
 
















-0.05 .00 .05 .10 .15 .20 .25 .30 .35
mean Predicted P<.0001 RSq=0.85
RMSE=0.036
 




Root Mean Square Error 0.036013
Mean of Response 0.102992
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 60
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 4 0.39053417 0.097634 75.2820 
Error 55 0.07132976 0.001297 Prob > F 
C. 
Total 
59 0.46186393  <.0001 
Parameter Estimates 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept  0.2204312 0.008903 24.76 <.0001
HAWKEYE  -0.145679 0.009298 -15.67 <.0001
AVIOCAR  -0.057384 0.009298 -6.17 <.0001
HURACAN Ex_He  -0.038696 0.012004 -3.22 0.0021
HURACAN MP_He  -0.040845 0.012004 -3.40 0.0013 
Figure 38.   Linear regression model of the most important controllable factors. 
 
The factors in order of priority are: the HAWKEYE AEW, the AVIOCAR 
MPA, the maritime prevention area patrolling of the HURACAN ship with a 
shipborne helicopter, and, finally the exclusion area patrolling of the HURACAN 
ship with a shipborne helicopter. The additional-interceptor factor is not included 
in the model because its p-value is too high, making it unnecessary in the model. 
The regression model explains 84.5 percent of the variability in sixty observations 
(twenty scenarios times the three-level factor of the additional interceptors), with 
an equation that contains only the four most important factors in the model. 
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The t-Ratio for “HAWKEYE AEW” (-15.67), is the largest value in the table 
and thus has the most statistical significance in examining the probability of 
destroying at least one platform. It is negative because there is a negatively 
correlated relationship (i.e., as “HAWKEYE AEW” is not present in the model the 
probability of destroying at least one platform increases). We can see in the table 
that all the t-Ratio values are negative. This is because the only factors in the 
model are the Navy resources; therefore all of them have negatively correlated 








































































A. ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Our purpose for this research was to explore the different possible 
scenarios that could face the Mexican Navy while protecting the critical assets in 
Mexico’s Campeche Sound. Each scenario differs from the others not only in 
respect to the resources of the Navy in the area, but also in respect to the 
uncontrollable factors that can be present during a terrorist attack. The study 
analyzes the data obtained by the simulation of multiple runs of each possible 
scenario of the Mexican Navy and the seventeen possible scenarios of the 
terrorist boats and fishing boats in the forbidden area during a terrorist attack. 
The data is analyzed in two parts: the full model that analyzes all the controllable 
and noise factors in the model and a subgroup of the data that only has the 
controllable factors in the model.  
The study uses three analysis techniques to look at the probability that the 
enemy destroys at least one platform. The techniques are: classification trees, 
regression analysis, and the one-way analysis of the means of each of the critical 
factors in the model. The critical insights are summarized in two sections: one 
that considers all the critical factors and one that considers only with the 
controllable factors. 
 
1. Critical Factors in the Full Model 
The important insights found analyzing the full model are summarized in 
the following list: 
 The most important factor in the probability of destroying at least one 
platform is the speed of the terrorist boats. This is because there is 
little time for the Navy to react against a fast boat. 
 
 When the HAWKEYE AEW is present in the area, there is a great 
significant increase in the probability of destroying the terrorist boats, 
no matter the number and speed of the terrorist boats. This is the 
single most important asset of the Navy. 
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 The probability to kill enemy terrorist boats before they reach an oil 
platform decreases when more than two fishing boats are in the 
maritime prevention area during a terrorist boat attack. This is because 
they divert too many navy assets to allow the navy to sufficiently cover 
the area. 
 
2. Critical Controllable Factors 
During the analysis of the data subgroup, which only includes the 
controllable factors (Navy resources), we perceived several important aspects of 
the model: 
 
 Because of its long range surveillance radar for detection and 
classification, and significant communication capability, HAWKEYE 
AEW is the most important factor in the controllable factors. 
 
 When the HAWKEYE AEW is absent in the scenario, it is important 
that the AVIOCAR MPA that serves in a very similar role as the 
HAWKEYE AEW (with less range in its surveillance radar) be present 
in the area.  
 
 The HURACAN ship is significant in the scenarios only if it carries a 
shipborne helicopter. 
 
 The patrolling area of the HURACAN ship is not important for the 
model. Both main patrol areas, the exclusion area and the maritime 
prevention area, have the same effect within the model. 
 
 The additional intercepting boats in the area are significant in the 
probability to destroy the terrorist boats only if the route of the terrorist 
boats lies within their patrol area. 
 
 The patrolling areas of the REDIGO aircraft and the helicopter 
patrolling are not significant in the model. This does not mean that they 
are not necessary in the scenarios; it means that any of these units’ 








B. FOLLOW ON WORK 
Following is a list of the follow-on research of value that could be 
accomplished using this work: 
 
 Analysis of different enemy courses of actions (COA) and tactics. 
 
 This study focused only on the actual resources of the Mexican Navy 
in the area. This model could be used to repeat the analysis while 
including additional Navy resources in the scenarios to see which is 
the best number and allocation for the units in the area.  
 
 Analysis of factors affecting the classification of time-critical targets. 
 
 The effects of policy changes, such as adjusting the exclusion and 
prevention areas. 
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APPENDIX A. PRELIMINARY MODEL 
The first model implemented was a simple one, incorporating all possible 
resources in the area and the listed uncontrollable factors. 
 
 E-2C HAWKEYE Airborne Early Warning aircraft  
 C-212 AVIOCAR Maritime Patrol Aircraft  
 HURACAN-class missile ship  
 Aircraft type L-90 TP REDIGO 
 Patrolling helicopter, type MI-17 
 POLARIS Interceptor boats in the area 
 Terrorist boats 
 Speed of the terrorist boats 
 Fishing boats in the forbidden area during a terrorist boat attack 
 
The regression model ended up with all the above listed uncontrollable 
factors and the following controllable factors: 
 
 E-2C HAWKEYE Airborne Early Warning aircraft  
 C-212 AVIOCAR Maritime Patrol Aircraft  








Preliminary Regression model 
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
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Prob Kill at least 1 Predicted P0.0000
RSq=0.90 RMSE=0.1373
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This model demonstrates that the area-patrolling of the REDIGO and the 
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